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
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SOUTHERN SECESSION,

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A LETTER

ADDRESSED TO

CAPTAIN M. T. MAURY,

CONFEDERATE NAVY,

ON HIS

LETTER

TO

ADMIRAL FITZROY.

JOHN WELSFORD COWELL, Esq.

LONDON:

ROBERT HARDWICKE, 192 PICCADILLY.

MDCCLXII.

Price One Shilling and Sixpence.



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SOUTHERN SECESSION.

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SOUTHERN SECESSION,

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SIR,

Anxious for the success of the South in its struggle for Independence, my joy at reading your letter to Admiral Fitzroy was great indeed. Here was at last a voice from one of her sons who is known over all the world for his services to humanity, setting forth the justice of her cause hitherto so entirely misapprehended in England. Here was that appeal which I had so long wished to hear, an appeal from tyranny to freedom—from falsehood to truth—from hypocrisy to honesty.

Some years ago I was placed in a very peculiar relation to American affairs; and, in the performance of what, at that time, was my duty, I became obliged to ascertain the nature and the character of the productive energies of the Union, and to consider in what manner they influenced its interior and exterior relations politically as

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well as commercially. This examination convinced me that the spoliation which the North was systematically practising on the South, through the Protective System, could not fail, if it should be much longer persevered in, to bring about a disruption of the Union. The patience of the South was, even at that time, almost exhausted—the burden it had to bear was becoming insupportable—already had it taken up arms, and been only quieted at the moment by a compromise which proved delusive—it still found itself, as before, robbed by the Northern monopolists of many millions sterling every year—it was still cut off by them from all direct commercial and financial intercourse with its customers and natural friends in Europe, and cast so entirely into the back ground that its very existence as the real and only foundation of American grandeur was entirely ignored by the world at large. That these were the facts and realities of the case as it stood in 1839, when I quitted the States, I had ascertained beyond all doubt, and I left the States convinced that unless this multifold mass of injustice should, if not entirely removed, be, at any rate, very greatly lessened, the South would, as it had long and openly threatened to do, spring up some day or other, and break free from its degrading bondage. It has now at last done so.

But the real character and motives of its action were altogether misunderstood in England, and I believe in France also. Owing to the Northern Protective system, we in Europe had no direct knowledge of the South whatever; all our knowledge of it, and this was very slight, came to us, second hand, through New England and New York—the commercial and financial factors and agents of the South—assuming the tone and manners of masters when they were servants, of principals when they were go-betweens, of owners when they were brokers.

Permit me here to say that you of the South ought not to be surprised at our ignorance on this side of the Atlantic of your affairs, still less are you justified in blaming us for it. How could we know anything concerning you, when you yourselves had so unwisely consented, in 1816, to the building up of that screen which necessarily shut you from our sight? Could you expect that *our* merchants would ship goods for you in *their own* vessels when those goods would incur the penalty of an extra duty—beyond that of the general tariff—because they were not shipped in Yankee vessels, but in ours? Did you not, by your sanction of this, shut the door in our faces when we were displaying every willingness to visit you? If Messrs B., of Liverpool were directed by some factor

at New York to ship 40,000*l.* worth of goods to Charleston, would this factor, acting on your behalf, permit them to employ an English vessel at the cost of 2,000*l.* *extra* duty upon its discharging the cargo at Charleston? It is not just for you to blame us now for our ignorance as to your real condition, and as to the motives of your actions, in the South, when you yourselves have been mainly instrumental in preventing us from obtaining any direct knowledge concerning you. With whatever national faults you may think your former fellow-countrymen chargeable, you will not, I think, consider us deficient in our notions of Equity, and therefore you cannot believe that our sentiments would, during the last twelve months, have run so strongly against the South as, unfortunately for you as well as ourselves, they have done, had we known the truth, and let me ask whose fault it is that we have not known it?

The position which I had for a few years occupied in America enabled me to learn the truth; and I felt myself called upon to declare it, not for the sake of the South, but for the sake of my own countrymen in whose service I had gained certain knowledge which, I thought, might now be useful to them, and this I communicated for what it was worth, in the accompanying letters. The publication of them

commenced in January, 1861, in the "Examiner" newspaper. You will perceive, should you do me the honour to read them, that I have set forth the case of the South as earnestly and fully, though far less cogently, than you have done.

Although these letters, as I have said, were not written with any direct view to Southern interests, or feelings, yet they express sentiments so favourable to the South that I hope they may serve as an excuse for a request I am now about to make. For in consequence of what I observe in one part of your letter to Admiral Fitzroy I wish to offer a few remarks for Southern consideration, and to be permitted to make them through you. I am constrained to address them to you in print, and in this public manner, because I believe, from your own account of the way in which your correspondence has been intercepted, that this method alone affords any chance of their reaching your hands.

Political Economists—enlightened men—have been for years declaiming against the Protective System, but no one seems to me to have delineated its hateful character, or pointed out its baneful results upon the happiness and prosperity of nations, with more convincing effect than yourself. In your letter to Admiral Fitzroy you trace the disruption of the Union to this as its true cause:—The New England States, you say, are manufacturing, commercial

sea-faring: the Southern are agricultural, and three-fourths of the exports of the (late) United States appear,—you say,—by English statistical reports, to consist of Southern agricultural products. Thus at the formation of the Union in 1788, the two sections presented themselves, under different physical conditions, the one as sea-faring, the other as agricultural. But soon the Yankees came up with representations of this sort: — “Fishing ought to be *encouraged* for *national* purposes; protect the fish we Yankees catch against fish caught by English, French, and Dutch, — give us a bounty.” This bounty was given for many years, taken ostensibly out of the common treasury of the Union, but practically and really out of the pockets of the Southern planter. After this system had prevailed for many years, and the Southerners had become fully aware that the pecuniary burden fell entirely and exclusively on themselves, while the profit went entirely and exclusively to the Yankees, the South demanded, and the North steadily and persistently refused, a repeal of the “Fishing Bounty Act.” Finally in 1812, to protect Northern interests and to vindicate the commercial rights of New England (for the South had neither ships to be searched, nor seamen to be impressed) *you* went to war with “old England.”

These are your own statements, and you

shew clearly that your consent to the Northern demand for a protective bounty on their fishing industry had been all along at the exclusive cost of the South, and that it had ended by involving you of the South in a war with "Old England," — a war with your own customers, friends, relations, with your real countrymen, with those to whose shores, at that time, every Southern gentleman who was able to afford it (without any exception, I believe) sent his sons and daughters to be educated—a war that was diametrically opposed to all your interests in the South, productive, commercial, financial, social, and political. Such, indeed, was the character of this war, and it had been predicted by the famous John Randolph of Virginia in his speech to Congress in 1806 which I happened to meet with the other day in the 20th number of the 'Edinburgh Review.' "The cry for war," he says, "is raised by the clamorous traders of the sea-port towns—men who cannot properly be said to belong to America, who carry on a commerce uncertain and transitory in its own nature, and much inferior both in respectability and solidity to those regular branches of industry, which *consist in the cultivation and exchange of American produce.*"

What now is to be thought of this Protective or Preferential System which by its very nature

severs the natural bond between producers and consumers, between friends and friends, nation and nation, stimulates the natural covetousness of the unscrupulous adventurer, converts him into the hard and tyrannical monopolist, develops every base, and represses every noble feeling of the heart, and by certain though perhaps slow gradations, finally enables the knaves to lead the dupes into a cruel and ruinous war against their natural friends? What is to be thought of a System which you and other Southerners describe as producing such fruits?

But to pursue your own description of it. With the peace of 1815, there arose,—you say,—a sort of Protectionists, men who said, “Let us not depend upon John Bull any more for anything whatever, let us do our own manufacturing, our own fetching and carrying, let us *protect* and *encourage* the workshops and artisans of New England, and as the agricultural labour of the South is so very profitable, we may charge it with the support of this New England (and Pennsylvanian) interest, for it has hitherto stood bounties to New England fishermen for years.” Let men legislate and theorize,—you say,—as they choose they cannot without robbery make any branch of industry *profitable*, which is not self-sustaining; to make it profitable *somebody must pay*, and as a rule the payment must come out

of the pockets of those whose industry *is* self-sustaining. The South yielded to these fallacious proposals, but this time the tax upon it was, under the form of a tariff, not of a bounty, and it had to be paid by the self-sustaining labour and industry of the South."

In all these representations I perfectly agree with you—purer wisdom never came from the pen of Adam Smith or Ricardo in my humble judgment, but you in the South had acted in defiance of its dictates, and after the experience of fifteen years, your eyes, in 1830, became at last fully open to the consequences of your short-sightedness in 1816. You found yourselves paying a tribute to the North which annually amounted, according to calculations which Mr Calhoun communicated to me in 1839, to many millions sterling, for purposes in which you Southerners not only had no direct or indirect interest, but which were employed—as you truly and correctly describe—in direct hostility to your own special interests. This tribute, however, was a spoil to be divided in which you could not possibly have any part; from *your* industry was it taken; it naturally engendered that numerous brood of unscrupulous land-speculators, jobbers, trading politicians, scheming financiers, &c., whose conduct and principles of action have corrupted public morality to the core. To

these, and such as these, you of the South had made yourselves the bondsmen.

Such and worse—you yourself are my witness—are the necessary, the natural, the proper fruits of the Protective System, and it has now once more attained its natural consummation in another bloody war, in the overthrow of your constitution, in the violation of all the safeguards for liberty and good government, which you have inherited from “Old England,” and in a total dissolution of society.

Now I come to the object of this letter. Will you of the South again re-establish this system? Will you again base the political edifice you are about to build for yourselves on this rotten and treacherous foundation?

It is with feelings of the greatest sorrow and disappointment that I observe, after all you have been saying against the Protective System, that towards the termination of your letter you joyfully announce that there is a high probability that Pennsylvania will join your new Confederacy, on condition that it shall enjoy manufacturing and commercial *preference* and *protection* with *you* (these alas! are your very words) “when, Birminghams, and Sheffields, and Liverpools, will spring up in it, in whose markets, you say, the wants of not less than 15,000,000 of people will be supplied, with which, and with

other advantages, Philadelphia, you say, might become, instead of New York, the commercial emporium of America."

It is no doubtful question whether Philadelphia *might*, under such circumstances, be the commercial emporium of America; it is a matter of absolute certainty that it will and must become that emporium. But what will the South become? How will the South be the better for this exchange of masters? Did not the grand producing South give last year to the market of the world, produce which was sold for, at least, 40,000,000*l.*? Did it receive in return, owing to the Protective System (with which in an evil hour it had consented to endow New England, New York, and Pennsylvania), in exchange for that vast produce, a greater quantity of the commodities it requires than it might have procured in the market of the world for 28,000,000*l.*? Did not the North despoil it of, at least, 12,000,000*l.* last year? Is it not against spoliation of this very kind that it has now at last taken up arms? Do you not yourself say so? Have you not clearly shown in your letter that the Protective System is a more certain and powerful solvent of political society than either diversity of faith, of language, of race, have ever proved themselves to be? Can you, while warm in the struggle for emancipating yourselves from the hateful dominion of

such a system—can the South really meditate repeating the suicidal folly of 1816, casting away all the teachings of experience set forth so clearly and convincingly in your letter, and under the momentary temptation of somewhat shortening the noble struggle, abandon the very ground on which it is fighting so heroically, and sell the meed of its large honour—that very Independence for which it is contending—for the dangerous assistance of Pennsylvania? And you—true son of the South—brave, frank, and unsuspecting, now fighting for your country with a price set upon your head, and with the halter round your neck—can you possibly contemplate with anything like pleasure so poor a termination of your efforts?

That Pennsylvania suggested this scheme I have little doubt, and none that she will eagerly embrace it. She is the most Protectionist State in the whole Union. I have no doubt that she would be ready—*now that she sees the North cannot conquer you*—to join the Southern Confederacy to-morrow, on the terms you mention, for they would infallibly transfer to her the commercial and financial ascendancy which New York has hitherto enjoyed, and be a splendid compensation for her cruel disappointment in the Morrill Tariff, which—as you know—was the bribe with which New England and New

York bribed Pennsylvania to give her vote against the South in the last Presidential election, a bribe which, owing to the Southern secession, has proved to be a mere shadow without any of the substance of spoil or profit. No doubt, she will now readily join your Confederacy, and—considering that she would be thereby enabled to appropriate the South commercially and financially, and this to the exclusion of the rivals she detests—she would probably be willing to undertake the factorage of the South on *lower* terms than hitherto, and be content at present with a Protective tariff in favour of her iron and coal of fifteen per cent., or less. But, in such a case, New England and New York will assuredly bid against her, and again become suitors for the favour of the fertile and beautiful South. In this case the war might come to a close, indeed, upon the terms of your returning to an Union on some such basis as a ten per cent. tariff, and a discriminating duty of five per cent. in favour of importations in North owned ships. But what would then become of that Independence for which you are now combating? Your affairs would still be regulated either at New York or Philadelphia—the South would still be kept in the background—shut out from direct communication with the rest of the world, and linked once more with her hated oppressors—with those who Mr Calhoun

so often and so emphatically declared to me, "are aliens to us of the South in all respects, socially, productively, politically—men of whom we know nothing and wish to know nothing."

Pennsylvania—the most influential State after New York — has generally (I believe always) given a Southern vote. If she consented to pay tribute to New England for cotton and woollen goods, fish, &c., &c., New England, in return, paid tribute to her for iron, &c. There was thus a fair exchange of disadvantage between them; but the South paid tribute to both of them without any return. And as it is in the nature of a monopolist to be ever craving after an increase of the monopoly, so Pennsylvania desired a still higher protection for her iron and coal, whereupon New England and New York bargained with her for her vote against the South at the price of the Morrill Tariff. And she sold it to them.

To such an astonishing degree has all sense of morality become blunted among public parties in America, that the ablest literary defender of the North, speaking of this transaction, says, "That pledge (viz., the bribe of the Morrill Tariff) would never have been carried further than a second reading if the South had not seceded. It was a sort of arrangement (viz., the sale and purchase of Pennsylvania's vote), you will say, which ought not to have been made; but it was *one* of

those which politicians *are in the habit* of making, &c., &c." So after all, it would seem that you of the South are mainly to blame for the actual passing of the Morrill Tariff; it was owing to *your* wilfulness in declining further connection with these high contracting parties that this measure for doubling the annual amount of the confiscation of your property became law. Pennsylvania, however, in driving her bargain, had not counted on your secession; this deprived her share in the booty of its whole value, and thus she had not only the bitter mortification of looking back on a base action performed in vain, but her impenitent grief was aggravated by the subsequent discovery that her two Northern allies had pre-intended to swindle her when the day of payment should arrive. Thus has Pennsylvania fallen to the ground between two stools, and she is now, no doubt, keenly desirous of recovering some standing in the good graces of the South, and of revenging herself, at the same time, upon her late perfidious colleagues. *They* were prepared to leave *her* in the lurch at the Second reading of the Morrill Tariff. This, indeed, was treachery, and *her* Volunteers resented it by leaving *them* in the lurch on the morning of the battle of Bull's Run, when, by an accurate calculation of dates, they found that their term of service had expired at that very precise

moment, and so they deliberately marched off from the field, and home to Pennsylvania, where they were welcomed with honour. No doubt Pennsylvania has been making the blandest overtures to you. Why should she scruple? What is there to withhold her? Why should she hesitate, from any pecuniary or political delicacy, to repay her late friends in their own coin? And would her now going over to you (upon the understanding, of course, of a low innocuous Tariff, but still high enough to secure *her* the exclusive — mind this, *the exclusive*,—commercial, financial, and shipping ascendancy which her late colleagues have hitherto enjoyed) be anything more than “one of those arrangements which Politicians, it seems, are in the habit of making,” and which her volunteers so judiciously initiated at Bull’s Run.

And will you accept her offers? Will you—the gentlemen of the South—of whom, in 1839, Calhoun always told me that “you were English in heart, in education, in habits, as well as in interests,”—will you now descend to do this thing? And merely that you may shorten by a very, very little, the glorious agony of your struggle? The very idea is enough to make the bones of Calhoun shudder and rattle in his grave.

War is a horrible thing—the stoppage of it a great good. I readily perceive how this

overture of Pennsylvania may lead to a truce—a negotiation—an arrangement by which the South may be allured into a return, on some conditions of compromise, to some sort of reunion with the North. But whatever shape such negotiations may assume you of the South must be the victim, because you can be of no value whatever to the North in any other character or relation. You are the prize for which Pennsylvania, New England, New York, all contend, and if a very large portion of your substance is not in some manner to be divided among them, you would be nothing to them, and not worth thinking about. New York and New England have hitherto had the largest—Pennsylvania the least—share in despoiling you. She tried to obtain what she might call her *fair* share, and she has failed. She is now endeavouring to obtain the *whole* amount of a diminished spoil, and as compensation for the reduced portion of one of its ingredients—the Tariff—she will stipulate for an indemnity in having the exclusive control of your commercial, financial, and shipping interests, as your merchant, banker, and factor. The instant that New England and New York find that you are seriously entertaining the overtures of Pennsylvania, they will offer to renew their connection with you on almost any terms you may propose. They will never—and can

never—consent to resign your carrying-trade; and to see Pennsylvania taking this out of their mouths is what they will never endure. Therefore I am in some measure prepared, should this Pennsylvanian negotiation go on to find them offering what will appear to European eyes reasonable terms of accommodation. I should rejoice at seeing a cessation of bloodshed; but I shall have no joy if the terms on which it is momentarily made to cease are such as will hereafter open its flood-gates still wider. You are now more than half-way towards Independence: you have but a little further to go in order to achieve it completely. Onward, then, I say, onward. Independence is the noblest object to which human beings can raise their hearts and hopes, and without it all the material enjoyments of life are but moral degradation. I can still hear the subdued tones of the iron-minded Calhoun when he spoke of the thralldom which he had been but too instrumental in his earlier career in bringing upon his country—of his own sorrow—of his hopes of contributing to its emancipation.

What natural connection have you with New England, New York, and Pennsylvania? What services do you want from them that you cannot perform more advantageously for yourselves? Why create an artificial connection with them, the

essential pre-requisite condition of which is that you make them your masters and yourselves their slaves? What do *you* gain—what *can* you gain—by sending your produce to Liverpool and Havre in a Yankee ship instead of an English or French one? What can you gain by paying five per cent. more duty on French or English goods if brought in French or English ships instead of Yankee ones? Why bind yourselves to so mean an obligation? And this, too, you must now do in unmanly deference to apprehension. In 1816 you were merely guilty of what you have since found out was a great folly, and at any rate you acted at that time with the self-respect that belongs to a free choice and will. Now you would be acting with the humiliating sense that you were submitting to what you loathe through want of spirit to reject it, and while you could scarce respect yourselves again, in this generation at least, you would find yourselves exposed to the scorn and contempt of your enemies. No—if you are in *this* generation what Mr Calhoun always declared you were in the last—you will not act in this manner. Virginia and Carolina will not belie their English, nor Louisiana and New Orleans their French descent. We here in Europe are your proper fellow-countrymen, and did we know you, or did you know us, we should mutually acknowledge each other as such. But whose fault has it been,

I ask again, that we have been dissociated and know each other not? How can France or England sympathise with you when you yourselves have been all along repudiating direct communication with them, and acting with them only through those whom John Randolph styles the clamorous traders of seaport towns, men who do not belong to America?

You are now about to reconstitute your exterior relations. It is of immense importance that you should not unwittingly introduce into your new system one of those poisonous principles which will work corruption throughout. This is what you did in 1816, when, under the delusive temptation of being all-in-all sufficient to yourselves, you rashly bound yourselves in the bonds of Protection with your accidental neighbours of the North. Certainly the Author of All has given to His creatures different climates, different soils, teeming with such various productions, different industrial tastes, tendencies, and capacities, and placed the Ocean between us, that our various capabilities of improvement and progress may be duly called into activity, and that populations of different race, language, climate and country, placed in the wholesome relation of mutual inter-dependence in supplying the wants of each other, may thereby be brought into harmonious co-operation, and so raise our common

species higher in the scale of Being. He wills that commerce should exist between His creatures, and experience proves that peace and goodwill attend it everywhere when it is suffered to run its natural course, and is not forced into unnatural channels by our perversity. Such is His Providence. The so-called Protective System is an organized rebellion against this, and instead of peace and goodwill, experience shews that malignant jealousies, envy, overweening greed, hatred, and bloodshed follow everywhere in its train. The narrow selfishness of the human heart has, however, almost everywhere led to its adoption, and everywhere with the same result. In this source originated your just separation from England in 1788 — this now breaks up your union with the North. Will you introduce into your new Confederation any taint—even the slightest—of this vicious principle? There is some reason to fear that you may be about to fall into this ensnaring error, not only from what you say about the possible union with Pennsylvania, but from other passages in your letter, and especially from the character of those congratulations on the sudden establishment of various manufactures in the South, which the President of the Confederation offers in his otherwise sound and dignified address.

✓ The evil nature of the Protective System has been brought directly home to your own feelings in the most sensible and unmistakeable manner by means of the strongly marked difference between the physical conditions of the Southern and Northern territories. This you have pointed out, and lucidly expounded. But upon scrutinizing your exposition it may be doubted whether your hostility to this system is not founded rather on a mere perception of the obvious injury it inflicts on the South, than on any examination of its nature, and of the unalloyed evil it must produce everywhere, in whatever shape or mode it may be put in action. It never can, and nowhere does, exist under any modification or limitation, without creating some separate class, which is only made separate by its members having a sinister interest, opposed to the general interest, and this is invariably monopolizing as far as its ability enables it to be so. It is of the essence of monopoly to render the articles with which it is concerned dearer than they would be in a free market, and thus to give the purchaser less value for his money than he is equitably entitled to receive, and the seller more money than is justly his due. The direct effect of every monopoly is to diminish the amount of national wealth, and its incidental effect is to render the monopolist encroaching, and the pur-

chaser angry. After the struggle of very many years, we, in England, have succeeded in pulling the Protective System up by the roots; but many small ramifications yet remain in the soil, from which spring serious mischiefs that still exist among us. Few things would be more beneficial to the health of the English artizan than the power of procuring a wholesome fermented beverage. I see by the paper of to-day, that the best ordinary Bordeaux wine is sold at Paris, outside the barrier, at 3½d. the quart. Southampton is as near to Bordeaux as Hayre; and therefore the price of wine in London, where there is no barrier, ought to be lower than at Paris; but our artizans cannot obtain this healthy, exhilarating beverage at all, the monopolies of the brewers and of the distillers leave them no choice but between bad indigestible adulterated beer, and unwholesome, intoxicating gin; and when Mr Gladstone benevolently endeavoured to open the trade in fermented beverages a short time ago, he was overborne by a combination of brewers, distillers, maltsters, and publicans, all of whom have a sinister interest in the ill-health and intoxication of the labouring class, and their sinister energies proved too powerful for his philanthropic efforts. Legislation can make no distinctions in favour of any particular article of industry without sowing the seeds of such noxious weeds as these, which, after

they have once germinated, it is very difficult to extirpate from the soil. You are now beginning *de novo*, you have hitherto been, and still are, the sufferers by this kind of legislation, and you seem to propose introducing the same impolicy of "preference for home production" into your new system. Your words are,—“If Pennsylvania be admitted, she will have free trade with us. The New England States will be taxed for every article *they* bring. For *they* will have to pay duties. Pennsylvania not.” Now, should you proceed in this manner, you will make many enemies—no friends—and impoverish yourselves. There is but one wise policy, and it is very simple. Be careful by whatever fiscal system you may adopt to establish no preference for any particular industry within the limits of your new Confederacy. Whatever customs duty you impose on foreign imports lay a corresponding excise duty on home products of a similar character. You will hereby increase rapidly in riches and power, and command the good-will of powerful friends in all quarters of the globe. If you want a military marine, purchase the ships and arms, and hire English, Dutch, and Scandinavian sailors, as the New Englanders do now. Their naval power has been entirely founded on your cotton, and on our abominable Impressment law. When I was in the United States, I ascertained

that there were more than 40,000 English sailors in Northern employ. They will flock to your ships, so far as prudence and profit may lead you to become your own carriers and owners of ships. Protective or monopolist legislation is ever short-sighted — ever ruinously dear in its results and suicidal of its own interests. Of this our Impressment laws afford a conspicuous proof. The English sailor is a skilled labourer who, unlike the soldier, has acquired his skill at his own charge, and consequently is justly entitled to receive the market value of his labour. He always was—and is—ready to fight, and he might at any time have been engaged in any numbers by the Crown at a trifle above the market price of his labour. The Crown impressed him because it was unwilling to pay him the full value of his labour. As long as he had no alternative he was compelled to submit to this tyranny; but when the emancipation of the American colonies opened to him the opportunity of service at full wages under the flag of the Union, the English sailors naturally crowded to it, in order to avoid—not fighting—but being robbed. This gave rise to our claim of search—that led to the war of 1812—and thus, for the paltry object of saving a few hundred thousand pounds, by an arbitrary interference with the wages of the sailor we were involved in an outlay of millions. No nation can with impunity sin against the simple laws of Poli-

tical Economy. The Nemesis is sure and certain. Admiral Carden told me that, when, after striking his flag to Commodore Decatur, he stepped on board the United States, he found more than half its crew consisted of native English sailors—that two guns had been fought by men who had everyone of them been on board the Victory at Trafalgar, and these two guns they had christened Nelson and Trafalgar respectively. Thus, they whose hearts had once answered enthusiastically to the immortal signal, “This day England expects every man to do his duty,” were soon after fighting with deadly effect against England, under the banner of “Free-Trade and Sailors Rights.” There is nothing in human affairs so powerful to bind and to loose as Political Economy. It is a very simple Science and its whole teaching may be resolved into one simple aphorism:—“do not interfere with the natural course of human action in the natural processes of the Production, Distribution, Interchange, and Consumption of wealth.” Buonaparte did this and he fell. The Yankees have done this and you are kicking them off. These are all instances of the loosening power of Political Economy: you will find a remarkable instance of its binding power, upon the occasion of the deposition of Richard of Bordeaux, which I quote from Froissart, in the second of the annexed letters.

You, individually, have the advantage of stand-

ing on the pedestal of great services rendered to mankind—every one will listen to your voice whenever you utter it—you are known to all. Your present correspondent cannot hope that much attention will be paid to anything that proceeds from him alone, and you and your countrymen may naturally enquire who is the person that presumes to address them in this somewhat didactic style. Let any one who can approach Mr Calhoun's son-in-law, enquire of him what confidence that great statesman and true patriot was pleased to place in my opinions, and you, personally, I will venture to refer, as far as may concern my sincerity, to the high-principled person to whom you have addressed your own letter. I must apprise you, however, that I take this liberty without having asked his permission, — that he is not aware that I am writing to you at all—and that I am ignorant of his opinions on the subject to which this, my letter, relates.

As I am writing entirely for the South, and without any indirect reference to my own country, I have not thought it necessary to say a word in this letter concerning the question of slavery. As far as it is connected with Secession at all, you have correctly pointed out the manner in which it is so connected. But since it is the entire misconception of this question, in its relation to the merits of Southern Secession, which has so

greatly misled us in England as to the justice of your cause, I hope you will excuse me for offering a few considerations to explain to what our apparent want of sympathy with you in your heroic struggle for Independence has been owing.

You will, I am sure, candidly admit, that in withholding from you our moral, financial, and material aid, we have acted in opposition to our own obvious interests, both as a commercial people, and as a great nation naturally seeking to extend its influence. Fortune has never before offered to England so grand and certain an opportunity of advancing both its wealth and power, as by your secession. In you we have, on land, a firm and potent ally holding out the willing hand; on our part, a blockade, from Portland down to the Potomac must speedily paralyse and disintegrate the North: and a great military authority long since laid before our military chiefs a plan, which he thought fit to communicate to me previously, calculated to render the invasion of Canada by your late compatriots too dangerous to be persevered in, even if attempted.

These men, who have been for years heaping insults upon England, are now completely at our mercy, and there are those among us *who know this*. Their insults we have all along despised, and we have not now felt it right to

avail ourselves of our vast superiority to do that which we have not hitherto thought just to do, although it is for our obvious advantage to do it. These are the general sentiments of the English nation, and they deserve universal respect, though, in my humble opinion, they would have been different, had the English known on which side truth and justice actually ranged themselves in this contest. But, I ask again, whose fault has it been that we have been deprived of knowing what the interests of justice demanded in this case? Deeply did Mr Calhoun deplore to me the consequences of the error he had been instrumental in committing in 1816, when, irritated by our insane attack on the chief city of the South in 1815, he, in common with other Southerners, urged the adoption of the Protective System, by which the South soon found itself cut off socially and commercially from all communication with its natural friends and connections in Europe, and owing to which England was placed entirely in the dark as to all that concerned the character of the Southern people. Earnestly did he entreat me that I would, upon my return to England, endeavour (little aware of my insignificance in England) to induce the British Government to send over a few men of intelligence and capacity to travel through the South, to examine its capa-

bilities, the character of its inhabitants, their institutions, and the effects of those on society, their disposition towards "Old England," and to report impartially their opinions and judgments on the facts as they should find them. "For," he would say, "If you in England did but know us—could but know us—you would see that we are your firm friends; that our interests are identical with yours; that our hearts yearn towards you; that we have been sadly cut off from all intercourse with you; that, as gentlemen living on our own estates, which require all our care for their management, it is impossible for us to travel in Europe as merchants do so readily; that we cannot come to you; that to be known and fully appreciated we must be seen where we live. There we should be found, as I presume to think, very like what English gentlemen are in England. We certainly feel ourselves English—how can we feel otherwise? Are we not entirely English?—what are we if not?—what else can we be? Certainly all our sympathies are with England and with Englishmen, but we cannot come across the water, and leave our properties, to tell you so. But we have, unfortunately, made over the control of all our interests to merchants, and brokers, and dealers, at New York and elsewhere, because the cultivation of our estates prevents us from

being merchants and owners of ships ourselves. We are determined, as one man, to cut away from all connection with those men. We hold out the hand to England: we are ready to associate ourselves again with her upon any conditions, not incompatible with our independence, that she might think suitable; and we wish her to know this as the truth, and to make the Alliance. And certainly to her we have much to offer—all our carrying-trade, and friendship firm and permanent, because it is based on common and permanent interests." This, and much more of a similar character, did he earnestly say to me; and he offered, if I would consent to undertake a formal mission to the British Government, to furnish me with credentials which should be signed by many of the chief men of the South.

Now the ignorance in which we in England were at that time concerning you in the South was entirely the result of your own legislation. Nothing has since occurred to dissipate it,—much to increase it. We hear nothing of you, and know nothing of you, but through your enemies at New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and with whom alone you have been pleased to put us in direct communication on all that concerns you. What accounts they give us of you, and what pictures

they draw, I leave you to judge—and while this is the case, how can you be surprised at the want of sympathy we have shewn towards you? It was the natural offspring of ignorance on our parts, for which I say with the greatest regret you yourselves were originally to blame. Is it just, then, to feel offended and angry with us? Certainly our eyes are now gradually opening—we can now compare your silent heroic devotion and its solid results, with the braggart vapourings and mean performances of your enemies, and you gain by the contrast. If the noble English spirit still survives anywhere on your Continent, it certainly is with you, and in no manner or degree with them. God grant that it may continue to animate you, and it will be certain to carry you, as it has carried your ancestors before you, over all difficulties, perils, and alarms, and bring you again to the society of your natural and real countrymen.

But besides our necessary and excusable ignorance regarding you, there is another cause of alienation in the strong feeling we entertain on the subject of the Negro race. It may be very true that we are somewhat inconsistent on this subject—that we are not averse to political alliances and intimate co-

operation, when needed, with the Brazilians, the Spaniards, the Russians, &c., with some of whom the condition of the peasantry is worse than with you, and with none of whom is it better, but the sound of the word slave (though actually a Russian word) is hateful to our ears, and as we do not understand the languages of these people while you speak and write our common mother tongue,—so all we learn about slavery is connected with *you*, and *what* we learn is supplied to us by your Northern enemies, selected and distorted for the very object of fomenting our aversion to it, and to you, as slave-owners. You will see what I say on this topic in the annexed letters, and to you I need say nothing here, except to express my belief that the best chance for the gradual elevation of that unfortunate race to a higher degree in the scale of humanity depends on your achieving your absolute independence in the South. A reunion, on any terms, with the North, or with any part of it, accompanied by a re-establishment of the restrictive system, would leave that race just where they are now. As I am writing entirely for the South, and not for my own countrymen, it is unnecessary that I should enter further on this topic than to suggest it to you as being one of the grounds for

our indisposition to second the efforts you are so nobly making.

We certainly, however, have meant to be impartially neutral in the contest between you and the North, although I allow, with regret, that we have not practically been so. Our respect for their blockade of your coasts, when we know it to be ineffective, was, and is, not an act of neutrality, but a violation of it. However, we ourselves suffer almost as much by this as you do, and you see that France, who cannot feel indifferent to the sufferings of her offspring in Louisiana, pursues the same course. I may be permitted, to congratulate you on the very dignified manner in which the Confederate President referred to this point in his late message.

And now, with the most ardent wishes for the full triumph of the South—in the earnest hope that you will not again enter into any exclusive and suicidal engagements with any part of the North—I will finish by again assuring you that I should not have printed this letter had I seen any other probable method of obtaining the means of laying my thoughts and feelings before you. I trust that through some channel or other a copy of it may reach your hands, when it will be for you to give, or to decline giving it, currency in your own

country according as you may or may not think it calculated to be of service to your cause, and with the greatest respect,

I have the honour to remain, Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,

JOHN W. COWELL.

London, Dec. 30, 1861.

41 Gloucester terrace, Hyde park.

To CAPTAIN M F. MAURY, C. Navy, &c. &c. &c.,
Richmond, Virginia.

POSTSCRIPT.

In conversation a few days ago with one whose opinions on international law are entitled to the greatest weight, I found that he had never seen the text of the "Act of the State of Virginia adopting the Federal Constitution, passed the 25th June, 1788," until it had casually fallen under his eye in your letter; and this was first made public in the 'Athenæum' Newspaper of Dec. 21, 1861.

Not only—I understood him to say—did this Act reserve to the State of Virginia the right of seceding from the Union, for cause, at her pleasure, but the exercise of this right drew with it a dissolution of the Government of the

United States then existing. The remaining Sovereign States might, if they chose, continue united, and even retain the same title ; but by so doing they would not retain all its rights, nor could they be called on to fulfil all its obligations.

Then, if such is the law arising from the legitimate exercise of her reserved right to secede, does it not seem fitting that this Sovereign State should now formally notify to the Nations of the World that she has exercised that right — that the political body known by the title of the United States is no longer the same,—and that persons who may assume to act in its name have no authority or right to act as if the secession of Virginia had not taken place ? Might not such a step on the part of Virginia strengthen the doubts already existing touching the blockades instituted by the Government at Washington ?

J. W. C.

I think it expedient to annex a copy of the Act of the State of Virginia, referred to in the Postscript to my letter, as I find it recited in Captain Maury's letter. He gives it with the date of the 26th; but I infer from General Washington's letter to C. C. Pinckney, of the 28th June, 1788, that the date of it was the 25th June, 1788, and not the 26th.

ACT OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
ADOPTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,

PASSED THE 26TH DAY OF JUNE, 1788.

We, the Delegates of the people of Virginia, duly elected in pursuance of a recommendation from the General Assembly, and now met in Convention, having fully and freely investigated and discussed the proceedings of the Federal Convention, and being prepared, as well as the most mature deliberation, has enabled us, to decide thereon, DO, in their name and in behalf of the people of Virginia, declare and make known, that the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them, whenever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression; and that every power not granted thereby remains with them, and at their will. That therefore no right of any denomination can be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified by the Congress, by the Senate or House of Representatives, acting in any capacity,

by the President or any Department or Officer of the United States, except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those purposes ; and that among other essential rights, the liberty of Conscience and of the Press cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified by any authority of the United States.

Washington's letter to Pinckney is given in the 9th vol. p. 389, of Jared Sparke's work. Washington was not a member of the Convention of Virginia, and writes from Mount Vernon ; he evidently had not seen, at that time, the text of the Act of Adoption. He had, however, received an account of it, and of its passing by 89 to 79, and speaks of it as being "likely to terminate the business (*i.e.*, the adoption of the Constitution) *here* in as favourable a manner as could be expected." Washington had feared that Virginia would refuse to adopt the Constitution in any manner.

*Letters on Southern Secession, to which reference is
made in the preceding pages.*

LETTER I.

JANUARY 25, 1861.

The break-up of the Confederation of the United States has taken the English public by surprise; we are speculating about the consequences to ensue from it—forming opinions about the character of the motives and intentions of the actors in it—but have made scarce any inquiry as to the causes which have produced it. It is a stupendous event; and as its good or evil influence on England's future prosperity will depend very much indeed upon the tone of sentiment which we may now immediately adopt regarding it, it is important to ourselves that the view we form of it should be just and true. If just, we shall proceed at once to take a course that will prove to be for the benefit of all; if erroneous, we shall be led into one that will be productive of evil.

However little weight may attach to my

opinions, yet the position I temporarily held in
 ✓ American affairs during the years 1837, 1838, and
 1839, justifies me, and indeed calls upon me to
 declare them, and this all the more strongly because
 they are of a very decided character, whether erro-
 neous or not. In the interests of England, as
 well of the Southern American States, I rejoice
 without reserve that they are separating themselves
 from the Northern States. Their union with those
 States has been of the greatest possible political and
 commercial disadvantage to them throughout, and
 scarcely of less disadvantage to England. The
 nature of their products and of their commercial
 wants is such that they have no natural connexion
 with the Northern States, while their connexion
 with England is naturally one of the strongest
 mutual inter-dependence. Three-fourths of their
 annual produce is sent to us, and while their crops
 are in process of growth, their plantations are up-
 held by advances, indirectly indeed, from English
 merchants and manufacturers. The condition of
 interchange of products between England and the
 South is such that their crop is almost entirely paid
 for by England in anticipation of its shipment. We
 took from them last year considerably more than
 2,000,000 bales of cotton, and returned to them,
 chiefly in articles of our own manufacture, to the
 value of more than 20,000,000*l*. This enormous in-
 terchange between them and us ought to be effected

directly, and not circuitously; but owing to the Federal Union, and to the injurious operation of its Tariff upon the South, it is artificially and unnaturally managed through the intrusive agency of New York and of the Northern States. Their intervention is wholly unnecessary, and it is quite as detrimental to us as to the Southern States, although—owing to the interest on our part being dispersed and divided among such a variety of different trades and manufactures, while the interest on their part is collected into the one enormous mass of their staple product, cotton—we do not here perceive or feel the magnitude of the injury to ourselves in the clear manner in which it is directly brought home to their perceptions and feelings there.

As the Tariff lies at the root of the disruption, and is, indeed, its determining cause, it is desirable to set this point in its true light, and for this purpose we must bear in mind that the single object and business of the South is to grow its cotton for England, and that the natural action of England is to send its ships to bring the cotton to our shores, loaded with our own manufactures to pay for it. This is the simple and natural relation of the only two parties concerned in the matter; perpetual peace, goodwill, mutual confidence, intimate alliance, ought to attend it, and would do so, were it not for the disturbing influence of the sinister

Northern interest. England and the South gravitate towards each other with the strongest force of commercial attraction. Each has enormous wants, and each desires exactly what the other has to supply. They form one system, and are bound together by interests completely identical. The Northern States have tried, and thus far with complete success, to keep them apart; and now that the burden has become at last too great for longer endurance, the Southern States break their bonds asunder, and cast them off, I trust, for ever.

It is not the existence of Slavery in the South which lies at the root of this contest. That did not become an element in the dispute until after we in England had abolished slavery in our own colonies—not yet thirty years ago—at which date the South had already revolted in arms against the oppressive monopoly of the North, and was only prevented from then seceding by a well-known compromise of the Tariff. The North has agitated the Slavery question since then, rather with a view of intimidating the South, hoping thereby to obtain a continuance of its acquiescence in the Tariff, than from other motives. The North, by introducing this sad reproach, has envenomed the quarrel, and hence to us on this side of the Atlantic, slavery appears to occupy the foreground of it. Slavery, however, has nothing to do either with its origin or continuance. The *causa causans* from the beginning, and

throughout, has been the Tariff, and this it is necessary to make clear.

The war terminated in 1815. In that year our Statesmanship had led us to attack New Orleans, and we afterwards proceeded to strengthen our own selfish Protective system by making laws against food and foreign timber. At that time we were conspicuously the richest among nations. They attributed our grandeur to our protective legislation, and they all proceeded to follow our baleful example. Foremost were the United States. They constructed their Tariff and made other arrangements, which were to make them a manufacturing nation, and also to secure to them the command of the carrying trade of the South. The South, misled by our example, and irritated by our recent attack on New Orleans, gave its assent to this policy. They were not long in opening their eyes to its injurious effects on their prosperity. They soon discovered that the cost of the materials requisite for the alimentation of their plantations was double what it need have been, without their getting higher prices for their produce in consequence, and that they had to pay higher freights, out and home, to the Northern ship-owner than they need have paid to the English, Dutch, Danes, or Scandinavians. It was no compensation to them for these immense disadvantages to hear that certain people, 1200 miles off in New England, were

spinning and weaving for their own exclusive profit a very small portion of the cotton they grew, and that these strangers were building ships to carry the crop to their great customer, England, at a higher freight than, without the Tariff-laws, would have been paid. They soon found that the whole advantage of the restrictive system, which the Tariff had established, was reaped exclusively by the North; that the whole disadvantage fell exclusively on them. The detrimental effect and its unmistakable cause were both equally clear. There was no variety of industry in the South to create confusion of opinion. The cotton growers constituted one great producing interest, spread over one particular portion of territory, and they discovered, when too late, that by their own blind folly, they had sold themselves into bondage to the North. Such a condition of relationship was not likely in the nature of things to last very long, and accordingly, finding that the North would not relax its hold upon them, they had recourse to arms, and revolted against the system under Jackson's Presidency. A compromise then took place, and the Tariff was lowered. But the South has laboured ever since under the mortifying sense of having been over-reached, and hence its bitter animosity to the North.

As the compromise left them still under great disadvantages, wholly uncompensated, they long ago

came unanimously to the resolution of seceding from the Union at no distant time. When I was in the United States in 1837, 1838, and 1839, I was, owing to the business that took me there, necessarily brought into contact with the leading public and commercial men of the day. I had abundant opportunities of comparing and sifting their different opinions. I held in my hands the signatures of many hundreds of the chief actors in the productive, commercial, and monetary transactions of the time, and the whole working of the commercial machine, internally and externally, was open to my observation. Long before I left the States in 1839, I had come to the conclusion that the Tariff, being for the exclusive interest of the North, and to the exclusive and very serious detriment of the South, could not fail to break up the Confederation ultimately; and I recollect remarking one day to Mr Webster, who was speaking slightly of Political Economy, that opposition to its maxims had been the real cause of Buonaparte's overthrow by rousing Germany against him, and that if persisted in by the Northern States it would inevitably cause the break-up of the Federal Union. The person who most enlightened me on this matter was Mr Calhoun. His views were masterly and comprehensive, and they were confirmed by everything that fell under my own observation. He was the leader of the South — a man whose penetrating intel-

lect pierced the future, which has now become the present. He embodied the opinions and feelings of the South, and when speaking of the Tariff and the Northern trap into which the South had unwittingly fallen, occasionally expressed himself to me with an earnestness of feeling that was most impressive.—“We Southerners,” he would say, “know nothing, and wish to know nothing of these men. I turn the back of my hand to them (holding it up towards the North). We are English in heart, in education, in habits, in interests—why will not your Government send fitting men to us in the South to learn the truth?—*you* are our natural allies and confederates, not these men—we support them indeed—they depend upon us—indeed, they lean upon us with a weight which we are determined, as one man, to shake off, aliens as they are to us in all respects, socially, productively, and politically—union with them much longer is impossible.”

The feelings of the Southerners towards the North have been greatly embittered since that time. They have now taken the step which they were upon the point of taking in 1833, and I do not think they will withdraw it. The attempt of the North to coerce them by force of arms, were it even to succeed, would make success a misfortune to themselves—to the South—to the negroes—to ourselves—and to the world—and perhaps the

result would be little better if it were to fail. I trust it will not be made. Owing to the Tariff, the interests and feelings of the two divisions are now diametrically opposite, and it is better in all respects that their inevitable separation should take place at once, and with as little bad feeling and disturbance as possible. I believe—nay, I am certain—that in such a separation lies the best hope for the amelioration of the condition of the negroes and for their gradual elevation to a state of freedom. After the separation there will be no longer any ground for these hateful quarrels about the extension of slave States and free States, which originate in the necessity imposed on the South of keeping the relative powers of the North and South evenly balanced in Congress. As to the suspicion of the South wishing to revive the Slave-trade itself, it is obvious that they, who are the proprietors of between three and four millions of negroes, worth, one with another, about 100*l.* a-piece, will never be brought to consent to a measure which would reduce their value by one-half. It is only those whites in the South who are too poor to purchase negroes at this enormous price that could be favourable to such a step, and their wishes, were they even to entertain such, may safely be neglected. No man alive can, I am sure, be found whose feelings revolt more strongly than mine against slavery in any form; no man can pant more ardently for

the time when its name as well as nature shall be withered from the world. I have accidentally been the legal proprietor of more than 400 slaves, and bless the day when the Legislature delivered me from the horrible responsibility of such a position, no matter at what loss ; but I know full well, and do not doubt, that the best way to proceed in the interest of the American negroes is that the Southern States should separate from the Northern as soon as possible, when, being delivered from the threats of the North, they will be in a condition to look dispassionately at this fearful question, and, sensible as they are of the great pecuniary interests they have in the well-being of the negroes, they must and will in the proper time be led to follow the example which is now offered them in Russia. I touch upon this topic because it is the only one which, I fear, is likely to lead us on this side to adopt sentiments and views on the disruption of the United States calculated to produce mischief. We can take no part whatever in the dispute in its present stage, but a knowledge that we are impartial—that we wish equally well to both divisions—that our sentiments do not turn against the South—and that in the event of their establishing their separation we shall receive them with welcome on exactly the same terms as exist at present, will go very far to abbreviate the present struggle and to lessen its evils.

One word more. Owing to the monopoly which the Tariff has conferred on the North, all the transactions of the South are liquidated at New York, and there the English houses have established their great Agencies. It is natural that our public organs should take their tone of opinion from these sources, for no others are open to them; and it is natural that these authorities should look with aversion at the violent and sudden action of the South without duly weighing the long-continued provocation it has received, because their actual arrangements are disturbed by it. Hence the Southern side of the question is in danger of being misunderstood in England, but it may, perhaps, be better appreciated if Mr Lindsay, who tried the other day to persuade the Northerners to abate something of their shipping monopoly, will favour the public with some idea of the nature of the obstacles he encountered in the North, and by so doing he will lay the South as well as the British shipowners and manufacturers under a great obligation.

JOHN W. COWELL.

41 Gloucester Terrace, Hyde Park.

LETTER II.

MARCH 9, 1861.

SIR,—Having received several applications for explanations of the topics on which I touched in my former letter regarding Southern Secession, I will endeavour to give some further development of them. I mean to say that the quarrel originated in the Tariff and Navigation Laws, which the Southerners found operating unjustly and injuriously to themselves, and in no other cause whatever.

The South was entrapped into consenting to the Protective Policy in 1815 and 1816, under the influence of that delusion about "Protection to home industry, Independence of foreign supply," &c. &c., which has its root in the meanest and narrowest sentiments of national selfishness; and had the sinister interests which the monopoly-policy called into existence been spread over the South, instead of being confined to the North, the South might have been led to suppose that it gained as much in one way by that policy as it lost in another.

But the distinctive difference between the character of Northern and Southern productions was so very evident as to leave no room for the slightest doubt as to the incidence of the profit and loss of this policy. Owing to slavery the South could

have neither sailors nor ships, nor, consequently, a "shipping interest," and thus the profits arising from the shipping monopoly created by the Navigation Laws were, and were seen to be, the exclusive perquisite of the North. The case likewise as to iron and metallic goods was similar, and indeed with regard to manufactures in general. The North fancied it gained an adequate—indeed far more than an adequate—compensation for submitting to a tax of 25 per cent. on foreign goods in the profits of the various manufactures which sprang up in the North under the influence of the protective laws, but the absence of manufacturing undertakings in the South opened Southern eyes and understandings at a very early period to their gross folly in having consented to the adoption of the protective system. No cloud could possibly be drawn over Southern eyes capable of preventing their discovering, and perceiving with perfect distinctness, that if the cotton crop of (say) 1830 sold for (say) 10,000,000*l.*, they had to pay—and had foolishly bound themselves to pay—2,500,000*l.* out of that receipt by means of the enhancement which the Protective system effected in the price of the goods they consumed. At one time the effects of the Tariff assumed even a ludicrous aspect. For after the Federal Union had paid off its public debt the annual expenditure became less than the annual revenue. Yet the Customs could not be

reduced (so thought the North) with safety to the Northern monopoly. So it seemed that a public revenue was to be raised for no public purpose whatever.

When the South took arms in 1832 and 1833 against this monstrous system, there was no doubt whatever—nor was it possible that there could be any—as to the point in dispute between them and the North. Neither the slavery nor the annexation question had, at that time, arisen; the South took arms simply and solely against the Tariff. Though the North thought it best to submit to a compromise at that time, and consented to some reduction of the Tariff, it nevertheless managed to succeed in preserving its monopoly, and its success then has broken up the Confederation now.

The Northern politicians adopted several courses to baffle, bewilder, and mislead the South. Constant fomentation of hatred and jealousy of England, and constant displays of insolence towards England were their readiest methods—they traded very successfully in these articles—and were constantly leading the South into a common sympathy with them on any casual subject of international interest that would give play to feelings of this class. Though the South had not, and could not have, any interest in the Maine and Oregon frontier, and in the Right of Search questions, yet they were such as to enable the North to engage the feelings

of the South in the contests connected with them. Subsequently—and after we in England had abolished Slavery—the North took up the Slavery question as one means of preventing England and the South from coming to understand the complete identity of interest that exists between them, and also for the purpose of acting upon the South through intimidation. These two objects have afforded the only motives which led them to agitate this question, for although in New England and Pennsylvania a few persons comparatively—Puritans and Quakers—are sincerely desirous of abolishing slavery, the great mass of the Northern community is not only indifferent to it (except as an instrument of political use) but is notoriously more inimical to the Negro race than the South.

The South is completely aware of the profound hypocrisy of the last manœuvre (the real character of which is now patently established by the readiness of the North to purchase a compromise by giving up this point), and nothing has or could have operated more strongly to intensify their hatred of the North, than this its device of holding them up to the eyes of England, and of the world, as at a moral disadvantage compared with themselves, when it is known that the proceeding is wholly insincere, and that the Northerners have been throughout engaged, by every indirect means in their power, in facilitating

the Slave-trade itself with Cuba and the Brazils, which horrible traffic has been, and is, chiefly carried on by New York itself.

I have no concern or interest in this quarrel, except that which is common to all of my countrymen. England, however, has great interests at stake in it — peculiar circumstances enabled me to see what those interests are — these I know to be entirely identical with those of the South ; and as I saw, a few weeks ago, that the real originating cause of the quarrel between the North and the South was overlain and hidden by secondary and extraneous points, I felt bound to endeavour to clear the question of them, in order that we might thereby be the better enabled to form a just judgment on its real merits, and guide our political course understandingly. The Protective System constitutes the sole originating cause of the quarrel, and is now the moving cause of the disruption. That system has been immensely injurious to the South — the South knows and feels this — and by now dissevering itself from the Union it takes means that are both just and proper to emancipate itself from the thralldom in which it has for so long been unjustly held ; — this, their protective system has been equally injurious to us in England, though from the multiplicity and variety of our interests we, on our part, are not so much

alive to the fact as the South is; but now we ought to rejoice heartily, as we can honestly, at the step which the South has taken, nor should we lose a moment in receiving her with open arms as the firmest of friends and the closest of allies, for such she certainly will prove to be.

This great event is the most conspicuous proof that has yet been offered to the view of mankind of the paramount importance in human affairs of attending to the well-established maxims of Political Economy. History does in reality teem with examples of this truth, but few readers of history, and not many writers of it, remark the fact. I will conclude by mentioning one in which unintended adherence to the simple truths of Political Economy was the cause of keeping up the connection between England and one of its most beautiful provinces for many years after it would otherwise have terminated. Froissart relates that the Bordelais were so greatly irritated at the English for deposing Richard of Bordeaux, that the French King thought he might succeed in detaching all that part from the English crown, and he despatched the Duke de Bourbon to the city of Agen to treat. The Councils of Bordeaux, of Dax, of Bayonne, sent deputies to hear his proposals. The Duke engaged that the King "*s'ils se vouloient tourner François,*

leur accorderoit tout ce que demander voudroient et leur scelleroit à tenir à perpétuité." The deputies returned and made their reports to the Councils, and these taking into consideration "comment le Royaume de France étoit vexé de toutes exactions vilaines dont ou pouvoit extorquer l'argent, si dirent ainsi." "Si les François dominoient sur nous ils nous tiendroient en ces usages. Encore nous vaut-il mieux être Anglois, quand nous sommes ainsi nés, *qui nous tient francs et libéraux*, que en la subjection des François. Nous avons plus de marchandises, de vins de laines, et de draps aux Anglois que nous n'avons aux François; *et si nous y inclinons par nature mieux*. Gardons que nous fassions traité nul dont nous nous puissions repentir."

Similar identity of interest had kept another province attached to the English connection in the reign of Edward the Third, as may be seen by referring to Thierry's 'Histoire de la Conquête, &c. &c. &c., and the same identity of commercial interests now draws the Southern States of the American Union to a close and perpetual alliance with us (if we are wise enough at once to accept them as friends), and detaches them from the Northern States, who have inveigled them into giving up their commercial independence. While Free Trade is the sure foun-

dition of peace on earth and good-will among men, the policy of Protection and exclusion has been the fundamental cause of the overthrow of more empires than that of Buonaparte and the American Confederation.

JOHN W. COWELL.

41 Gloucester Terrace,
Hyde Park Gardens.

LETTER III.

MARCH 28, 1861.

SIR,—My object in addressing the public through your journal on Southern secession was twofold. I wished to prevent the formation of a precipitate judgment on the merits and probable effects of that sudden and surprising event, and also to show how the opinion and action of England might influence the course of it towards our own welfare. I did no more, therefore, than indicate those points of the question which related to this two-fold object. I did not mean to treat them at any length, nor to treat at all that large question of which they are a part. I said that the secession of the South originated entirely from the selfish policy of the North in its restrictive and protective laws,—that the South had always been, and was now, ready to enter into intimate commercial relationship with England (which the North never has been, and never will be), and that it was immensely for the interest of England to accept the tender which the South makes. I gave no more reasons or grounds for these opinions than seemed sufficient for making them intelligible.

Nor should I now say any more on the subject, but for an article in the 'Times' of this morning, which I think is of a misleading tendency. In offering the whole of its carrying trade to our ship-

owners—the whole of its import trade to our merchants—in imposing duties on imports for fiscal purposes *only*, and not for prohibitive or protective purposes—the men of the South, though thus going, in fact, to the utmost limits of Free trade, may not be influenced by enlarged and philosophic appreciation of the deep wisdom of Free trade; but I say that the Southerners are so circumstanced that the *practical* wisdom of adopting free trade is forced in upon their minds with the strongest conviction—that they energetically *will* to adopt it—and that if they now make any legislative provisions which appear to contravene this desire—they will make them without intention, and merely through such blunders and mistakes as are but too frequent in all departments of our own legislation. I think it, therefore, very injudicious, as well as very unfair, to impute to the South “the desire to fix upon England the expenses of their unnatural and inglorious combat” with the North. The influence of the ‘Times’ extends far and wide for good or evil. Nothing is more calculated to injure the vast interests which England has in this matter than to proclaim that the South has such a nefarious desire as this, and as nothing is, or can be, more unfounded than such an assertion, nothing can be more likely to alienate from us the good will of the South—yearning after our friendship—than imputations of motives so unworthy and so undeserved. The Southern States have long been

held by the Northern in as base a thralldom as it is possible to conceive, and the combat into which they will now enforcedly enter is neither unnatural nor inglorious, but the contrary.

Neither can I appreciate the justice any more than the wisdom of the "Times" in imputing to the South the principles and policy of a swindler and a thief in its proceedings. I earnestly hope that the Southern public will not be led to believe that these are in any way the opinions of the British public regarding them. "The South," says the 'Times,' "has cleverly appropriated to its own use all the goods that have fallen in its way, without any very strict regard to title." The South has, however, long ago paid its quota—and far more than its just proportion—towards the acquisition of these "goods," and of all others belonging to the Confederation of which it was so lately a member; and, in withdrawing from it, is certainly entitled to take its own share of the partnership property.

I rejoice to think that what I have said in your columns has had some good effect among the Southern States, and I am willing to hope that they will still turn to us in England with confidence, notwithstanding such ill-judged provocatives to mistrust as the 'Times' of this day offers to them.

JOHN W. COWELL.

41 Gloucester terrace, Hyde park,

LETTER IV.

AUG. 28, 1861.

SIR,—In January last, and again in March, I think, I ventured to declare my opinion in your paper that the cause which had gradually led the South to secede from political union with the North was the Restrictive Commercial System established by the United States. The Southern States had found this to operate to their injury—they had risen in arms against it in 1831—they had at that time obtained a modification of it which had not satisfied them—and when I was in the States in the years 1837, '38, and '39 such Southern gentlemen as I met with were unanimous in declaring that the pecuniary loss which this System annually inflicted on their territory was so very great, and the commercial and industrial disadvantages under which it placed them were so very heavy, that the South remained unanimously resolved to secede from the Union, and would certainly do so at its own time. I stated my belief that the Restrictive System was the sole cause of the actual disruption.

This disruption is a stupendous event in the tide of human affairs. We ourselves are spectators of it from a distant shore—our passions and interests are not directly involved in it as actors, however

strongly it may move our feelings as men. We stand towards it in the relation of judges observing and investigating, and not of parties interested in the establishment of any particular conclusion as to the causes that have brought it about. But those causes call for the strictest investigation nevertheless; and, from being impartial, we are more likely to arrive at a sound judgment regarding them than the Americans themselves.

✓ Three causes have been alleged, shortly designated as Slavery, Territory, and Restrictive Tariff. Some inquirers are content to believe that all three have combined to bring about this extraordinary event; others, such as your Parisian correspondent "E. L. G.," and Mr Ellison, whose work you review, affirm that "Slavery—and Slavery alone—is the cause of the revolt of the Southern States."

When these States revolted in 1831,—when, as Mr Ellison himself informs us, "South Carolina *went through the preliminaries* of secession, and Mr Calhoun *resigned* his office of Vice-President of the United States, and was spoken of as the probable President of the *new* Confederacy," what did they then revolt against? Mr Ellison himself tells us in the very same paragraph—they "*revolted*" against the Tariff. At that time the Tariff, ✓ *and the Tariff alone*, Mr Ellison informs us, had brought the Union to the very verge of a civil war.

At that time it cannot be pretended that there was any question about Slavery whatever. The South revolted against the tremendous commercial oppression, the grinding, the destructive, the most iniquitous monopoly of the North. The North forced the South to purchase its manufactures by means of a protective duty of 25 per cent. on English and French goods. It had become clear to the South that they were annually paying 25 per cent. more for the alimentation of their estates than they need pay, and they "revolted" against a further continuance of political union with those who insisted upon oppressing them in this frightful manner. The compromise had proved unsatisfactory, the concessions of the North illusory, and the pecuniary burthen on the South became heavier as the expenses of cultivation increased by the gradual exhaustion of old lands. The subject was one of the greatest importance that had ever occurred in human affairs, and in 1838-39 it fell directly in the line of my duty to examine, and to endeavour to comprehend it. I had neither predilections nor prejudices to disturb my judgment, such as it is; and I accepted no representations as facts, and no opinions from others, without examining, weighing, and comparing them with what I saw all around me.

Not only was it a fact—a fact that could not be disputed—that the Northern manufacturers com-

pelled the Southern landholders to pay 25 per cent. more than they needed for the alimentation of their estates (an act which, as long as human nature is what it is, would drive any body of men engaged in the prosecution of their pecuniary interests to take up arms anywhere), but by connecting their Navigation Laws with their Tariff they had deprived the South of direct commercial and financial intercourse with their customers in England and in France. In the picture of American affairs the natural position of the grand producing South was in the foreground, but by the operation of the Northern monopoly it was thrown altogether into the rear. The South could only have indirect access to the customers in Europe, who were its natural allies, through those who were *not* its customers, *not* its suppliers—who were not only *not* its allies, but, plainly, its commercial and financial despots and oppressors, and who had no other relation with it whatever than this forced and unnatural one. There was no point in their case which the Southerners dwelt on with more bitterness than this. “Not only,” they said, “are we systematically robbed every year to an amount so great that we cannot estimate it, but we are cut off from all direct intercourse with our natural friends and allies—our customers and our relations.” And this was and is strictly true.

When we ascertain the positive existence of a

cause adequate to produce an observed effect which is actually under our investigation, it is folly to look for any other cause. Mr Ellison tells us that the tariff *was* the cause of the *incipient* secession of 1831, and I thoroughly believe him. I myself am a witness that the Southerners—eight years after, in 1839—were determined to secede for that cause, and for that cause only. I was myself present in 1839 when the leader of the South urged an English gentleman to allow himself to be commissioned by the South to bring before the English Government the position of the South, for the purpose of assuring it that the South was not only ready to cut all connection with the North, but also to return to any political relation to England that England might be willing to form with it; and I was informed at the time that he would be furnished with proper credentials and sufficient powers from the South, had he consented to undertake this mission.

When no one can possibly deny that such a system as the American Tariff and Navigation Laws is a cause perfectly adequate to the production of the effect which Mr Ellison says it did produce in 1831, when I found the same cause in aggravated activity in 1839, when I saw the sense of wrong growing deeper, and the hatred becoming day by day more inveterate in the Southern mind, what ground can I now possibly have for supposing that

the South, in now at last seceding, have abandoned their original grounds for the resolution, and adopted others?

When this momentous event occurred at the close of last year it took the world by surprise, and it was an event in which the whole civilised world was concerned. I thought, erroneously perhaps, that accident had given me some knowledge regarding its cause, and I felt called upon to make this public at once, because it appeared of a nature to guide in some degree the sympathies and judgment of England in a right direction, and calculated to mitigate or prevent the tremendous evils which otherwise seemed certain to ensue. I lament, though I am not surprised, at my ill-success, but the same motive still urges me forward, when I see an increasing risk of public opinion being—as I venture to think—further misled.

Both parties in this frightful contest are aware that but a very slight action on the part of England would terminate it. The South says little or nothing—at any rate, we have no means of hearing her voice. The North speaks aloud, and in what tone? What sort of sentiments, of principles, of morality does its voice reveal? To the South it says: “There—we have profited by our majority in Congress to pass the Morrill tariff—but we have *also* passed all sorts of laws for consolidating Slavery—take the good with the bad.” To England:

"You have the strongest antipathy to Slavery—we are going to war against slave-owners—if you don't sympathise with us your best friends among us will say that you are (these are the words of your correspondent E. L. G., and they are but a very feeble echo of what our "friends" in the North have been addressing to us for some time) a parcel of hypocrites who have been putting on a show of anti-slavery zeal for the mere purpose of annoying *us*." To the South again: "Here—return to us, and we will assist you in annexing Mexico on *your* side, and you shall assist us in annexing Canada on *ours*." To England: "What, are we making war against slave-owners, and do you dare to acknowledge them as belligerents?" To the South: "We make war against you, *not as slave-owners*, but to bring you back with all your Slavery institutions unimpaired under the protecting ægis of Union with us." To England: "Beware, we are giants—our flag, in conjunction with that of France, shall sweep your flag, in conjunction with the black flag, from the seas, and reduce your power to nothing." To the South and to England: "We have an army of 500,000 men, it will conquer you Southerners, and then, flushed with conquest, it will demand to be led against Canada, to avenge the insult in acknowledging the South as a belligerent."

Is there in all this a single act, motive, principle, or intention exhibited or suggested that can excite

the faintest sentiment of respect in any human bosom?

Your correspondent E. L. G. proclaims that most of those who think that Slavery is not the cause and motive of this war are guilty of intentional misrepresentation, for "questions about Slavery were"—he says—"the sole issue raised at the last Presidential election. There was not, either in the Northern or Southern platform," nor "in anybody's mouth, a word about free trade and the tariff,"—and "if, after all this, the quarrel is not about Slavery, it would puzzle any man alive to say what it is about."

Thus is he pleased to speak. He is an actor in this dreadful drama, and surely the heat he betrays is calculated to disqualify him for that calm investigation which the subject demands, and which is essentially requisite for enabling him to form a sound judgment, and even for recognising the facts before him in their true relations. Has it done so?

When two great parties in a State have been hating and fearing each other during two whole generations; when one labours under an intolerable sense of wrong, on account of which it has for more than thirty years been constantly and openly avowing its intention of separating from all connection with the other, and when the other is conscious of the reality of this wrong, and never-

theless persists in maintaining it from motives transparently selfish,—where ought we to look for the real cause of the separation, when at last it takes place? To the great primary and steadily operating grievance, or among the many incidental sources of irritation that have sprung up during the main progress of the enmity? The mutual animosity of the parties has found food for its indulgence in various questions of more or less gravity which were continually springing up, assuming names and shapes which no memory can recall—which absorbed attention for the moment, and then passed off the scene. But the South, ever since it became fully sensible of the thralldom into which it had been entrapped by the Protective Tariff, has endeavoured to obtain some compensation for present evils, and to secure itself against the certain aggravation of them, by struggling to preserve the numerical balance between the slave and free states, and how necessary to its protection was this policy is now convincingly shown by the use which the North made of its first victorious majority. *It instantly augmented the oppressive Tariff.* But by this sort of policy the South gave itself the appearance in the eyes of the world of advancing the extension of Slavery to the foreground of the long-standing quarrel. While mere self-defence alone impelled the South to claim the extension of Slave States, the desire to maintain its

despotical monopoly impelled the North to oppose it; and thus to us who loathe the very idea of Slavery, the North came to have the appearance of being inimical to it. But the extension of Slave States was not an *end* with the South, but only means to an end. And similarly the opposition of the North was not an end, but the means to an end, of preserving and extending its monopoly. Thus it has come to pass that the battle between free trade and monopoly has latterly been fought on the "platform" (whatever that may be) of Slavery. But that man who has had the opportunities which fell to my lot of observing the different characters of Southerners and Northerners,—and the very strong material and political interests which divide them—must be differently constituted from me if he thinks for a moment that this secession originates in any other cause than the Northern monopoly, or believes that the political action of the North is in any way influenced by anti-slavery zeal. There are men in the North who loathe Slavery as much as I do—I have friends among such and I have heard them say that on this ground they should hail the day when the South would execute its purpose of separation. But these were the sentiments of particular persons only; no such public sentiment exists in the North—the noisiest opinions there on all subjects connected with justice, equity, honour,

and morality have overpowered quiet thought during the last three months, and as they are such as prompt to cut the throats of all those who refuse to re-unite themselves *and their slavery institutions* with the former Union, it is surely unnecessary to characterise them.

One word as to your objection to the soundness of my opinion that the cause of the secession is the tariff alone, and that Slavery never was, and is not, any part of that cause. You say, and certainly with much apparent force and justice, that I must be mistaken, because "when the South *had the staff in its own hands*, it did not use it to repeal the highly protective tariff, nor to mitigate its restrictive action, but to make the free states accessaries to the recovery of fugitive slaves. The South *when in ascendancy* preferred tightening the thralldom of the blacks to emancipating itself from the mischievous trammels of the protective system. . . . With the South, the extension of Slavery was the first consideration, the abatement of the tariff hardly the second, for it was not even mooted."

What I have just been saying regarding the policy of the South in seeking all means of defending itself against further encroachments of the North will perhaps serve to modify your opinion as to the weight of this objection. Much of its apparent force resides in the metaphorical phrase of having the staff in its own hands—of being in the

ascendancy. The South has never at any time had any staff in its hands, nor any ascendancy that it could use for any such purpose as wresting from the firm gripe of the North the terrible commercial, financial, and nautical Monopoly which the Tariff gave it. The South has had, by sufferance of the North, a certain power in Congress which has at times appeared to the rest of the world as very great; but it has never had a majority that would have enabled it to repeal the Tariff. The power which the North permitted it to exercise was in the nature of a sop to Cerberus. Where was the power which you suppose in it when Mr Calhoun, being Vice-President in 1831, resigned his high position, and the South revolted in arms against the rising Tariff?

JOHN W. COWELL.

LETTER V.

SEPTEMBER 19, 1861.

SIR,—The public opinion of England possesses great influence among the Americans, and it is not too much to say that they will be found unconsciously to defer to it in all cases in which they feel that it is founded on a just and thorough understanding of the subject giving rise to it. Had the public eye about December last been so directed as to pierce through the superficial pretexts and colourings which prejudice, sentiment, and misconception of realities,—and to speak the truth, general ignorance of the real nature and real origin of the schism,—contributed to cast round it, we in England should have taken a very different view, and have pointed it understandingly in a very different direction from that which we have unfortunately observed. Had the opinion of England on the character and merits of Secession been just and true, I believe its expression would have dispersed, *in initio*, this dreadful blood-storm, which was then gathering on the other side of the Atlantic, and which has since burst. We are still far from taking a clear and decided view of the subject, and the confusion of points essentially distinct is sometimes so glaring that it appears almost as if it partook of wilfulness.

The reason why certain Sovereign States seceded

✓ from the Union in October last is *one* thing; the
 ✓ reason why certain Northern States elected to
 wage war against them in May last is another thing.
 English interests were immensely affected by each
 of these events, but in *one* manner by the secession,
 ✓ in *another* by the war; hence a correct understand-
 ✓ ing of each of them is correspondingly important to
 enable us to act wisely regarding them, even at this
 late hour; why, then, persist in confounding them
 and their different causes together? The 'Times,'
 on the 9th, assuming somewhat the tone and cha-
 racter of a judge charging a jury, in directing the
 nation what verdicts it is to find on several points
 in this awful trial, commences:—

"Few have pretended to give, and fewer still
 have succeeded in giving a consistent view of
 the *casus belli* in America. Never was the origin
 of a great struggle more inscrutable than that of
 the one now raging."

Certainly, whatever was the cause which pro-
 duced the secession of the South in October last, it
 ought to be distinguished from the cause, what-
 ever it was, which induced the North in May last
 to enter Virginia, and to commence waging war
 against the South. The South, in seceding, had
 justly exercised an incontestable right in a tem-
 perate and inoffensive manner. The Sovereign
 Southern States said to the Northern:

"Government, you know, is instituted and exists

merely for the protection of persons and property: no confederation of men or of States need consequently consist of a greater number than is necessary for amply securing this end. We, being perfectly able to protect our persons and properties against all enemies both external and internal, are not under the necessity of confederating with you any longer for that purpose—the confederation has for a very long time worked to our very great inconvenience—we therefore have resolved to discontinue the connection—we secede from it accordingly—and the joint property which we hold in common partnership will have to be peaceably and equitably divided between us—you will take your just and proper share, and we shall take ours.”

This is, *practically*, a perfectly fair representation of the state and relation of the facts attendant upon the secession when the South announced it to the world in (I believe) October last. The North received it very tamely—so tamely indeed as to astonish the majority on this side of the Atlantic. Certainly this singular apathy had its significancy, and in itself required to be well considered and accounted for. What was the meaning of it? What did it indicate? This riddle became more difficult of solution, when, all of a sudden—in the course of a few days—the North burst into fury against the South and against England, waging war against the one and all but declaring it against the other. There must have been some peculiar and determining cause which led to this apparent inconsis-

✓ tency, and that cause must have had its source in some general sentiment of the Northern mind. It must have been, however, in this sentiment that the *casus belli*, of which the *Times* speaks, originated. It did not originate in secession, for then it should have sprung into life four or five months before.

Can we throw any light upon this extraordinary occurrence? Why did the people of Boston, New York, and Pennsylvania, rise up in sudden frenzy last May, and in order to indulge their blood-thirsty malignity against the South, overthrow their own vaunted Constitution, trample upon every safeguard of liberty, extinguish the free expression of opinion, and introduce every contrivance of European despotisms—spies, police, passports, arbitrary imprisonment, searching of women, opening of letters, &c., &c.—all around them? Is this the free, the good, the model-Republic? Are these horrors indicative of a good cause—of a good conscience? Why, not even the self-styled Representatives of the Supreme Being, in the height of their power, ever opened more widely every hellish passion of the human heart in the cause of what they call religion than the Washington politicians are now doing in the name of—what? Perhaps the following considerations may serve to throw some light on this matter.

When the War of Independence had ceased, the

connection between the South and the mother country very soon became much closer than it had ever been. Our factories were increasing, and we took all the cotton which the Southern planters produced. All who could afford it invariably sent their children to England for education. Nothing could be more intimate than the relationship between the South and England. Then ensued the French war. Thereupon, in consequence of our brutal Impressment law, the English sailor took refuge in the American merchant service, and the Northerners grew instantly to be the carriers for the world. Ships they could build for themselves, and our blind tyranny provided them with sailors. This caused them to become inimical to England, but their hostility did not at all involve the feelings of the Southerners, who being planters, did not turn their attention to ships and ship-building. However, in 1812, they succeeded in dragging the Southerners into the war against England, who were nevertheless so reluctant to enter upon it, that, after a little while, they canvassed projects of separating themselves from the North, and of making a separate peace with us, their natural friends and relations. In this happy and promising posture of affairs our Statesmen directed a terrible expedition against their principal city, and thereby converted them in a moment from being warm friends into bitter enemies. The Peace ensued a

few months after this, and then the South, burning with natural indignation against England, was induced to make common cause with the North, and to accede to its scheme of a policy of what is called "Protection to Native Industry." From that day to this the South has never handed over a less annual tribute than the value of one-fourth of its annual production to the farmers, manufacturers, merchants, and shipowners of the North—gratuitously—without receiving directly or indirectly any equivalent,—*à pure perte*, as the French say. Its cotton crop of last year is said to have realised more than 30,000,000*l.*, and with free trade the Southerners would have received for it commodities worth, *in the market of the world*, more than 30,000,000*l.*; but, under the operation of the protective tariff, they received no greater worth of commodities than they could have purchased in a free market for 22,500,000*l.* To this loss must be added the further loss, fine, or penalty they incurred in freight for the purpose of protecting (as it is called) the Shipping Monopoly of the North.

As there was no variety of industry in the South, as its chief product was the great staple of cotton, there was no existence of any sinister interests among them to blind their sight, or to confuse their judgment as to the direct spoliation which this system inflicted on them, their eyes gradually opened

to this accordingly, and they gradually turned them once more towards England. During this period the North had discovered what a very lucrative share of the partnership had fallen to them. They saw how entirely its permanence depended upon a continuance of delusion on the part of the South, and how this might be maintained, among other means, both by keeping alive its angry feelings against England for its barbarous attack on New Orleans, as well as by connecting its feelings of pride and triumph at the well-merited defeat which the English had received there with their own peculiar maritime successes in the war. It was the policy of the North to cook up and to multiply as many common sympathies as possible on such points, the better to countervail the increasing sense of antagonistic interests on the part of the South. This policy is the key to that rude, captious, aggressive tone of action and manner which the politicians of Boston and New York have imported into all their transactions with England :

“See what fine fellows we are when all together ! See how we make the old country tremble ! She venture to board ships sailing under our flag to see whether there are slaves on board ! She venture to enlist men on our soil to fight against Russia—*our natural ally as a slave-holding country* (these were the words of some great Kentuckian at St Petersburg, whose name I forget).—Send the British Minister at Washington to the right about. See how our Empire extends, how powerful

we are when combined—and what is the bond of our power but that wise system of protection to home industry and native shipping, which may, perhaps, press a little harder on you of the South than on us of the North, but for which you are amply repaid by your sense of national importance, and by the grand position we occupy in the world, respected all over it as a first-class power."

It was by the application of the principles and motives indicated in this Summary that the New York Prime Minister, upon assuming the reins of Government under the new President, hoped to control and manage the Secession storm, as I shall presently show :

"The State of Pennsylvania," says your Paris correspondent, Mr. Godkin, "is the most rabidly protectionist of any in America. To secure its adhesion at the last election was of the last importance, and it was only by means of a *pledge* from the republicans that an attempt should be made in the following Congress to secure FURTHER protection for native industry that Pennsylvania's vote was secured for Lincoln. The pledge could never have been carried further than a second reading (of the Morrill tariff) if the South had not seceded."

I extract this admission from Mr Godkin's letter for the purpose of showing how absolutely necessary it had, at last, become for the South to carry into execution its long-formed intention of seceding. On the crop of 1860 the North had robbed it of commodities to the value of not less

than 8,000,000*l.*—but this was not enough—the power to rob it of a still greater amount in 1861 was the price asked by Pennsylvania for its vote for Lincoln, and agreed to by New York and Boston. There is certainly nothing strange in the determination of the South to secede from such confederates !

I have well considered the prominent persons and the salient points in the shifting scene of American politics since last autumn, and combining all that I have thought significant, I account for the action of the North in the following manner: I should first say, that as far as my observation and experience of the play of American politics and party are concerned, the *outside* appearance of motives and things is *never* the reality, of which fact this purchase and sale of the turning vote of Pennsylvania is a striking illustration. New England, New York, and Pennsylvania did *not* combine, says Mr Godkin, to rivet the chains of their monopoly still firmer round the neck of the South, but Pennsylvania, he says, “had always been more lukewarm in the free-soil cause than any of the other Northern States.” So New England and New York offered this bribe to Pennsylvania; “a sort of arrangement,” he goes on to say, “which perhaps ought not to have been made, but it was one of those which politicians *are in the habit* of making, and it proves beyond question that

the Republican party made the war against Slavery its first and main object."

These are Mr Godkin's words; they are glaringly inconsistent with the fact that the North immediately gave up the whole question of free soil and slavery to the South. But there is another feature in this "arrangement" deserving of remark as illustrative of Northern political morality. Boston and New York bribed Pennsylvania to go with them against slavery, with a bill at six months, which they did not intend to honour at maturity, and which was only accidentally paid owing to the secession of the South, by which Boston and New York found themselves left without any colour of excuse for not paying it. I beg to say that I neither withhold nor give credence to this particular representation. I am far from doubting Mr Godkin's own belief in its authenticity, but his *naive* adduction of it will probably be thought to throw some collateral light upon the character of Northern political morality, and will serve to render my explanation of the action of the North in this matter less doubtful than it otherwise might appear.

Every one remembers that when the secession took place, the public sentiment of England ranged itself altogether against the South and in favour of the North. We did not understand

he matter, it is true, but our feelings on the subject of Slavery led us instinctively in this way; there was nothing at all ambiguous in our conduct, and the North neither had, nor could its politicians believe they had, the slightest colourable pretext for mistaking it or doubting our sincerity. They saw us acting in diametrical opposition to our interests, commercial, manufacturing, and maritime, in not instantly recognising the South, and with such sentiments as always influence them, they despised us for our foolish simplicity. Their insincerity in rousing against us all the bad passions of the North was transparently clear. But they adopted this course as a great political move, and they started it simultaneously at home, and by their Ambassadors, Messrs. Burlingham and Clay in Europe. It was a necessary ingredient in their scheme for bringing back the South to the Union. That plan was to bribe the South by the offer of the conquest of Mexico and Cuba for the extension of slavery, and to take Canada to themselves for the extension of free soil. The South contemptuously rejected this unholy proposal, and stung to fury at the certain prospect of losing its long-enjoyed monopoly and by this disdainful refusal, the North is now recklessly indulging its vindictiveness by a war which all the world must see can have no

other object than the wanton destruction and ruin of the South.

The war which it is waging against the South, is a gross scandal upon civilization and humanity—so great an outrage, that it is a serious question whether it is not a duty which France and England owe to the World, as well as to themselves, to interfere and put an end to it at once; and certainly, if ever the greatest possible injury to the material interests of nations can justify them in taking arms against the wanton perpetrators of it, France and England would have that justification to the fullest extent in the present case, for their populations have long enjoyed the fullest right to trade with the South; and the North, in denying them their legitimate enjoyment of it, knowingly inflicts upon them the greatest distress, and is, in fact, waging war as effectually against them as against the South. If France and England suffer the North to pursue its career of blood, they may possibly be called upon by their own manufacturing populations to take this measure when it will have lost more than half its efficacy.

J. W. C.

LETTER VI.

OCTOBER 25, 1861.

SIR,—The following remarks in the ‘Saturday Review’ of the 21st of September, made an impression upon me which has grown stronger through events which are every day coming to view, and I address you in consequence:

“For the Americans themselves the question of the origin of secession can have very little interest now. When once fighting has begun, one cause of quarrel is just as good as another. But the case is very different with England, *for our part in the proceedings is still to come.* The origin of the strife is of considerable interest to us, as it may be one of the elements in a *decision that will probably be forced upon us before very long.*”

This is a very serious as well as a very suggestive remark. We may indeed find ourselves called upon very suddenly to decide between the alternatives of submitting to the destitution of our manufacturing population, and enforcing their right to purchase cotton from those of whom they have always hitherto purchased it, and who are willing to sell it to them as heretofore.

The “origin of the strife,” says the Review, must be one of the elements in our decision. Certainly it must be so; and for enabling us to allow its due weight to this, we ought, in the interests of

justice, to ascertain its nature and thoroughly to understand it.

Some points in the investigation of this momentous subject have become transparently evident. It is quite clear that the South, in seceding from the Union twelve months ago, neither wished nor intended to wage war against the North. This is a fact completely established ; so completely that it is obvious that even at this very moment the South has no wish to continue the war ; that all it wants is to be left alone. Another point equally clear is, that the North was not under any *constrained necessity* to declare war against the South, that the inhabitants of Pennsylvania, New York, New England, &c. &c., were no more threatened in persons or property by the secession from the Union of the Southerners than were the inhabitants of Canada. All the late United States were, when colonies, constrained to make war against England eighty years ago by a *real* necessity, because England assumed a right to take their property, in the way of taxation, without their consent. But no similar constraint exists, or existed in the present case. The North was not called upon to submit to unjust taxation, nor to any similar injury by the secession of the South.

Thus far we clearly see that the *war itself* did not originate with the South, but with the North ;

that the South did not wish for war, but for peace ; and that the North wished for war, and not for peace.

But what, then, is "the origin of that strife" on the ascertainment of which *our* decision may be found to depend? What, in other words, is that object which the North seeks to obtain by the war it has chosen to wage, and which the South is resolved to defend to the last drop of its blood? This object is certainly the "origin of the strife," and this is what we are called upon to ascertain.

There is no difficulty whatever in ascertaining this object, none in defining it, none in measuring its magnitude. The antagonistic interests of the North and South are brought to view in the broadest manner by considering the difference in their respective industries and productions. In attempting an exposition of this, it is better, for brevity's sake, to take round numbers, as well as to suppose the South to produce nothing but cotton, and the North to be chiefly manufacturing. Last year the Southerners produced as much cotton as they sold in the market of the world for more than 30,000,000*l.*, and they were entitled to obtain, and ought to have obtained in exchange, as much of all those commodities which conduce to the enjoyment of life as could have been purchased *in the market of the world*, for more than 30,000,000*l.* But

being artificially restricted to a market in which they had to pay a fine of twenty-five per cent. *ad valorem* on every thing they purchased, they received in exchange for their whole crop no greater amount of commodities than they could otherwise have purchased for 22,500,000*l.* They were thus directly despoiled of the value of 7,500,000*l.* in commodities, at least, and since 1833 the minimum aggregate of the spoliation to which they have been subjected for the exclusive benefit of the Northern manufacturers and shipowners exceeds 200,000,000*l.* And the Southerners know this.

This is the case of the South. In 1839 Mr Calhoun showed me various calculations making the loss *special*ly inflicted on the South by the direct operation of the Northern Tariff, amount even at that time, to more than 7,500,000*l.* annually, and I know that it is now much greater than this sum. But I will not stop to enforce this, satisfied that my statement of the *special* loss is greatly within the real and true limit. This is the case of the Southerners. The North may say, "Your special loss is not so great as this, and, besides, you receive at our hands some benefit in return." The South replies, "We will not enter into any discussion with you on the matter; we ought not to be subjected to *any* special loss, however small. We send a bale of cotton to Liverpool and sell it for 10*l.*; with that 10*l.* we there pur-

chase one ton of hammered iron; we bring it home; *there* the Pennsylvanian iron-master makes us pay a fine of 2*l.* 10*s.* because he is unable to manufacture a ton of such iron under the price of 12*l.* 10*s.* We annually send 3,000,000 such bales into the markets of the world; on each of them you fine us 2*l.* 10*s.* It is of no consequence whether you take from us this fine on each of our bales as we pack them on our plantations, or upon the article we take in exchange for it when we bring that home. In either case you directly confiscate the value of one-fourth of our crop. Such, at all events, is our belief and opinion. We are certainly the only proper judges in this case. We want nothing of you, either politically or socially; and as you are resolved to keep up this system on your part—in spite of all our remonstrances—we, on our part, are resolved to dissolve partnership with you.”

I have ventured to make my opinions known through your journal, and nothing less than the most earnest convictions could have induced me to overcome my repugnance to obtrude upon public notice. The earnestness of my conviction is certainly no warrant for its justice, but it may be accepted as an excuse for my offering an opinion even though this should be thought of little value. Those who will read this letter are already aware of the circumstances under which my judgment

was formed, and which called upon me to declare it. That opinion is (and of its truth and soundness I have the most undoubting conviction), that the cause which impelled the South to secede from the Union was the Protection Tariff which the North had imposed on it; that this was the *sole* cause of the secession—and I think it a very just and sufficient cause.

It appeared to me, in the outset of this matter, of the greatest importance that we should clearly understand this to be the fact, because, had we so understood it, and had we not, as we most unfortunately did, mixed up the question with that of Slavery, the public opinion of England would at once have ranged itself on the side of justice, and the influence of this, had it been unequivocally pronounced in January last, would have been so potential as to prevent this frightful war altogether.

There is nothing on which the moral sentiment of England is stronger than Slavery. We ourselves have been guilty of a great crime towards a helpless race incapable of defending itself—we have repented—we have endeavoured to redress the wrong—we have striven, and we are still striving at great annual loss, in valuable lives as well as in money, to protect and defend the negroes against the cruel cupidity of others—and our baffled endeavours have raised our previous feelings to an

intensity not very favourable to the formation of a cool and impartial judgment on the merits of a question with which this grand outrage on humanity may appear in any way to be connected. Hence the public sentiment of England ranged itself at once, and without examination, against the Southerners. They were slave-owners, and that was enough.

But the explanation of the way in which the question of Slavery came to be connected with the quarrel between the North and the South is simple enough. Each Sovereign State sends so many Representatives to Congress—if there is a greater number of free-soil than of slave States, the free-soil States must have a majority in Congress, and to what purpose the North was certain to turn that majority the Morrill Tariff shows. Hence, as long as the Union continued, the South on its side struggled to keep the slave States as many, numerically, and the North to keep them as few, as possible. The South, on its part, was striving to defend itself against an augmentation of the Monopoly, and the North, on its part, was striving not merely to maintain, but as the Morrill Tariff evinces, to augment it. The point at issue throughout has been the Monopoly, and nothing but the Monopoly. The noisy and odious contest about “free-soil and slave-soil” was not a contest about Slavery itself, nor for the extension or contraction

of this hateful condition, but it was throughout a struggle on the part of the South to defend itself against a direct spoliation, never amounting in any year to less than 8,000,000*l.*, and on the part of the manufacturers and ship-owners of New England, New York, and Pennsylvania to maintain and to enlarge this enormous injustice.

We fell here into the natural mistake of imagining that the North sympathised with *our* feelings regarding the Negro race because it was politically opposing the slave-holding States. No error could be greater. The North has no sympathy with our feelings of commiseration for that injured race. The general and the sustained action of the North throughout has been such as upheld and aggravated the injury. It is notorious that the Slave trade with Cuba and the Brazils has been carried on by the ship-owners and capitalists of the North. By denying us the Right of Search they have succeeded in obtaining a practical immunity for this disgraceful traffic. A slaver now—if it meets an English cruiser—hoists the American flag and passes on; if an American cruiser, it hoists the Spanish, or some other flag, and passes on. While with us public opinion is such that it would visit with social outlawry any English ship-owner or merchant lending himself to this abominable traffic; with the Northerners it is such that those engaged in it hardly appear to feel themselves under the

necessity of concealing it. Their antipathy to the blacks—personally and as human beings—is far stronger than that of the Southerners, and I have seen such instances of its intensity as I should be afraid to describe, and now can hardly believe that I could have witnessed.

The cause of secession is one thing—the cause of the war is another thing. The leaders in the South Carolina Convention declared that it was neither the election of Mr Lincoln nor the non-execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, nor both combined, which constituted their grievance, but that the cause of their discontent dated from 1833, when South Carolina made a vain attempt to save herself from the Protectionist legislation of the Congress at Washington. The South thus very distinctly announced, at the time of seceding, what was the cause of its secession, even if this had not been so notorious as to need no announcement. In the election of Mr Lincoln, and in the bribe of the Morrill Tariff offered by New England and New York to the iron-masters of Pennsylvania, if Pennsylvania would give its casting-vote in favour of Mr Lincoln, the South beheld its certain ruin, and it very justly severed its connection with those who manifested a fixed determination to persevere in despoiling it. But it seceded quietly and inoffensively: it did not declare war against the North, nor did it desire

war. The North subsequently assembled in Congress. It passed laws to make the maintenance of Slavery, wherever it now obtains, an integral and unalterable portion of the Constitution. How, in the face of these facts, is it possible to suppose "that the South has taken the field in defence of Slavery, and the North in defence of freedom?"

The North began the war in (I think) May last, by invading Virginia. It was under no compulsion, direct or indirect, to declare war against the South; it was neither attacked, nor threatened with attack. It was not a war of defence, but of aggression; and the cause it alleged was, "to force the South back again into the Union, with all its Slavery institutions protected, guaranteed, strengthened, and perpetuated."

The war is now raging, and we shall be called upon ere long to take some practical decision as to our course in relation to it. It is certainly necessary—in the highest degree necessary—that we lose no further time in coming to a clear and distinct conclusion on the nature and merits of both these points, viz., the cause of secession, and the cause of the war.

The immediate well-being of one-sixth of our population is, and has been all along, directly involved in this war. When this large portion of our fellow-subjects, living for the most part from hand to mouth on daily wages, shall inquire of the govern-

ing body, "Why have you not employed the means at your command to protect us in the enjoyment of our right to purchase raw cotton of the Southern States of North America, whereby alone we are enabled to put bread into our mouths?" will they be contented with this answer? viz., "Those States were united with certain other States, from which a few months ago, they thought fit to separate; whereupon those other States declared that they would do that which unavoidably would have the effect of preventing you from purchasing any more raw cotton of the seceders; they have stationed ships of war along the Southern coasts to prevent you from sending ships to bring over the cotton which you have hitherto industriously employed as the means of preventing your children from starving; we regret this, but, *by the laws of war*, those other States had a right so to act." May not our population be apt to reply on this: "The laws of war are certainly as good for us as for them; if these laws justify them in doing that which positively deprives us of bread, they will certainly justify us if we invoke them for the sacred purpose of procuring bread where we have always been in the habit of procuring it. Why did you not apprise these Northern States in the outset that, without going into any examination of the rights they advance, if they should proceed to enforce them in a way which would necessarily reduce *us* to starvation, you, as our guardians,

should be under the necessity of employing the force which we have placed at your disposal to secure for us free access to the sources from whence we obtain our only means of living? Explain to us the causes which prevented you from doing this. You know that had you in April last even intimated a contingent intention of thus proceeding, should these Northern States on their parts proceed to wage war against the South in such a manner as would starve and absolutely ruin *us*, they would thereby have been altogether deterred from waging a war of this character; and (even upon the very improbable supposition that they would have been mad enough to carry their intention into act notwithstanding your notification), had they declared war against the South and carried it on in such a way as *necessarily* involved our certain destruction—why did you not assert and defend our rights by declaring war against them at once on our behalf, and thereby enable us to take the benefit of those laws which you now plead as your justification for suffering us to starve? When is, or can, war be more just or holy than when waged to save innocent and unoffending millions from ruin and starvation wantonly entailed upon them by the selfish and savage passions of men, regardless of the blood they shed, and of the wide-spread misery they produce, in their endeavours to preserve a tyrannical pecuniary Monopoly.”

A few short months may possibly exhibit this

